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Abstract: American trade with Asia rose from 10% of total imports in 1870 to 15% in 
1913.  U.S. exports to China relative to the population quadrupled over this period as 
well.  Scholars have studied U.S.-Japan trade for this period but have done little work 
on U.S.-China interactions.  I therefore developed bilateral trade data for the United 
States and China from 1865 to 1914 and analyzed these data to reveal trade patterns and 
terms of trade between these two countries.  The terms of trade improved for the U.S. 
between 1895 DQG&RWWRQPDQXIDFWXUHVDQGPLQHUDORLOZHUHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶
key exports to China; exports of these goods increased by factors of 651 and twenty-
three, respectively, between 1865 and 1914.  Tea imports to the U.S. peaked and then 
declined drastically during this time period while imports of silk grew in importance, 
increasing by a factor of eighty-four.  
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Introduction 
China has grown to become a world superpower in exports.  For example, the level of 
exports from China to the United States over the last twenty-three has increased exponentially, 
from $293 million in January of 1985 to over $39 billion in August 2013.1 
China and the United States have not always had such a close trading relationship.  In my 
work, I focus on the time period from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of World War I. I 
chose to examine this time period for two reasons.  First, this was the era in which the United 
States because an important player in the international economy. 
Second, this period was when James J. Hill rose to power.  Hill was a self-made 
businessman and a railroad magnate of the late 19th century.  He is NQRZQDVWKH³(PSLUH%XLOGHU´
because of the magnitude²both physically and economically²of his railroad, the Great Northern 
Railway.  This railroad stretched from St. Paul to the West Coast; his actions directly affected 
settlement in the Northwest region of the United States, and his end goal was to establish U.S.-
Chinese trade connections and to open up the Chinese market.  Hill saw Asia as an enticing 
potential market, but it led to great personal and professional disappointment in the end.  +LOO¶V 
lifelong dream was to interact, and travel to, Asia, but this dream barely became a reality (Martin, 
1991, 62).  He never traveled to Asia,2 and his attempts at foreign trade were unprofitable. 
The Asian market was underdeveloped by Western standards, especially during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, and the United States experienced a period of extreme growth and 
LQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQGXULQJWKLVVDPHWLPHSHULRGVRZK\LVLWWKDW+LOOGLGQ¶WVXFFHHGLQHVWDEOLVKLQJ
trade with China?  Was his experieQFHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDVDZKROHRUZDV+LOO¶V
                                                   
1 U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2 The closest Hill would ever come would be to send his son, Walter Jerome Hill, on the first voyage of his ship, the 
Minnesota, to Asia in 1905. 
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lack of success unique to him?  Historians claim that Hill was inhibited by governmental 
regulations and not granted government subsidies which made competition against Western 
international companies unprofitable (Malone, 1996, 276-277).  More generally, scholars claim 
the Robber Barons ignored Asia because the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued 
regulations did not allow the US to develop Asian markets.3  As a result, the US was bested by 
foreign competitors in Europe and Canada and prevented from exploiting this rich market.  
Furthermore, scholars such as H.W. Brands (2010) argue WKDW$VLDQ WUDGHZDVQ¶W LPSRUWDQW to 
American business because they preferred to focus on internal trade rather than international trade 
(20).4 
'RWKHVHUHDVRQVDFFXUDWHO\H[SODLQ+LOO¶VIDLOXUHWRHVWDEOLVKVWURQJWUDGHUHODWLRQVZLWK
China?  In this paper, I address this question by analyzing East Asian trade data from 1865 to 
1914.  Then, I will compare my findings with the traditional stories told by historians in order to 
see if the usual explanations IRU+LOO¶s lack of success in Asia are supported by the overall picture 
for American trade during this time period. 
Very little quantitative literature exists on this topic.  Thus, in this thesis, I develop bilateral 
trade data between the United States and China from 1865 to 1914.  This is the first time these 
annual data have been assembled and analyzed.  The information was collected from the Annual 
Report and Statements of the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics on the Commerce and Navigation 
of the United States and from a dissertation by Shu-Lun Pan, the only other scholar to have studied 
this topic quantitatively.  However, though Pan presented quantitative results, he only examined 
                                                   
3 The Robber Barons were businessmen and entrepreneurs who were suspected of engaging²and sometimes proved 
to have engaged²in allegedly unethical business practices and stock market exchanges in order to amass great 
personal fortunes.  Some well-known 19th century Robber Barons are Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and 
John D. Rockefeller. 
4 Other explanations that Malone (1996) and Martin (1991) propose are that the Chinese markets were not developed 
HQRXJKWRUHFHLYH$PHULFDQJRRGVDQG+LOO¶VLQH[SHULHQFHLQWKHVKLSSLQJILHOGOHGKLPWREXLOGWKHZURQJW\SHRI
ships. 
     3  
five-year intervals did not perform any analysis on them.  He simply listed the quantities and values 
of specific goods for selective years.  I will follow up the collection of my bilateral trade data by 
analyzing trade patterns and the terms of trade between the United States and China between 1865 
and 1914 as well. 
After analyzing my data, I conclude that both total U.S. exports to China and U.S. imports 
from China increased substantially between 1865 and 1914.  The terms of trade became more 
favorable for the United States at the end of this time period as well; however, for a majority of 
the time period, the U.S. terms of trade with China were less favorable than the overall terms of 
trade.  Only during the time period following the turn of the century was it more favorable to trade 
with China than it was to trade with the rest of the world.  Exports to China as a percentage of total 
exports declined between 1865 and 1871, and then remained relatively constant, fluctuating 
between 0.5% and 1.5% of total U.S. exports.  The percentage of imports from China as a share 
of total U.S. imports ends around 2%, relatively close to its initial level in 1865; however, for the 
majority of the time period, this percentage ranged anywhere between 2% and 3.5%.  The most 
popular exports were cotton manufactures and mineral oil, increasing by factors of 651 and twenty-
three, respectively.  The most notable imports were silk and tea: imports of silk increased by a 
factor of eighty-four, and by 1914, tea declined to a sixth of its peak level in 1873. 
The next section of this paper addresses the historical context by presenting the background 
RI+LOO¶VGHVLUHWRWUDGHZLWK$VLDThe section WKDWIROORZVSODFHV+LOO¶VHIIRUWVLQWKHEURDGHU
context of the literature on late 19th century American trade.  Next, I explain the economic theory 
behind my research, followed by my descriptive model.  After, I discuss the sources from which I 
collected my data.  Finally, I present and explain my results and wrap up with a concluding section. 
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Historical Context 
America in the 19th and early 20th centuries experienced major growth.  The population 
grew from half a percent of the world population in 1800 to about five percent by the turn of the 
20th century.  U.S. participation in world trade correspondingly grew over this time period, from 
about three percent of world exports in 1800 to fifteen percent in 1900 (Lipsey, 2000, 688).  Due 
to the differences in population between the United States and Europe, with these levels of exports 
³WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDV WZLFHDV WUDGH-oriented as Europe, and more than five times as export-
oriented as the world as a whole´ (Lipsey, 2000, 685).  This statement reveals the importance of 
foreign trade in the United States during the 19th and early 20th centuries.   
Prior to the 1870s, the United States imported more than it exported, much like today, but 
this trend reversed in the 1870s when the U.S. started exporting more goods.  7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶
reliance on exploiting and selling its natural resources to the world both preceded and directly 
followed this trend reversal.  It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that the United 
States began to export manufactured goods (Lipsey, 2000, 692, 703).  Foreign investment in the 
United States was another common element at this time.  Lipsey (2000) states that this investment 
ZDVXVHGWRIXHO³WKHODUJHVSXUWVLQWKHGHPDQGIRUFDSLWDOWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HGWKHUDSLGO\JURZLQJ
HFRQRP\´ DQG ZDV RIWHQ FKDQQHOHG WRZDUG infrastructure projects, such as canals, railroads, 
utilities, and communication networks, supervised by either the government or private companies 
(697). 
This is the context in which James J. Hill was raised and worked.  Hill lived in an age 
where the United States had recently become a net exporter to the world, where plentiful natural 
resources allowed for low production costs and therefore higher profits, and where foreign capital 
was readily available to fund infrastructure projects, such as his railroad which eventually 
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stretched across the Pacific Northwest.  +LOO¶s dreams reached beyond connecting the 
Northwestern United States to St. Paul and, eventually, Chicago with the most efficient railroad in 
the business.  He wanted to dominate the transportation sector by pressing his advantage, the 
ability to ship large loads at low rates, and extend his reach across the Pacific Ocean and into East 
Asia.  Hill had a vision of opening China up to the world.  He thought that East Asia was the 
ultimate outlet for American goods, especially agricultural products, because it was an untapped 
market with a large population; he also believed that China was developed enough to reciprocate 
trade and send valuables such as silk to the United States. 
-DPHV-+LOO¶V LQWHUHVW LQ WKH2ULHQW5 was a passion long before he became the Empire 
Builder.  He always saw Asia as a land of opportunity.  Among the richest men in the US in the 
1850s were those who sought their fortunes in the Orient.  Some traded furs to the Chinese for 
other goods.  Others built faster ships to speed up trade.  Some actually moved to Asia to develop 
OXFUDWLYHWUDGHV³$ZLOOLQJQHVVWRH[LOHRQHVHOIWRP\VWHULRXVGDQJHURXVFRUQHUVRIWKHHDUWKZDV
FRPPRQO\FRQFHLYHGWREHWKHEHVWDQGTXLFNHVWZD\WRDFKLHYHRQH¶VIRUWXQH´0DUWLQ 1991, 21-
22).  Hill, who was born in 1838, was an impressionable young man in the 1850s; he was just 
starting to go out in search of his fortune, and the pull of the Orient was nearly irresistible.  
However, in spite of the fact that Hill was emotionally drawn to Asia, he realized that the most 
likely way for him to travel to Asia was to ship out as a sailor.  He was not keen on this idea and 
GHFLGHGWKDWLIKHFRXOGGRQREHWWHUWKDQWDNLQJDMREDV³DFRPPRQVDLORUEHIRUHWKHPDVWWKHQ
his destiny clearly must lie elsewheUH´0DUWLQ 1991, 28-29).  Instead, Hill chose to head toward 
Minnesota.  This path provided him with a few alternatives.  He could pursue an opportunity on 
                                                   
5 7KHXVHRIWKHWHUP³2ULHQW´LQWKLVSDSHULVGHULYHGIURP+LOO¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI(DVW$VLDDWWKLVWLPH$OWKRXJK
WRGD\WKHXVHRIWKHZRUG³2ULHQW´VRPHWLPHVLVVHHQDVRXWGDWHGDQGLPSRVLQJ:HVWHUQGRPLQDQFHRQWR$VLDWKLV
term is used because Hill used it in many of his writings, and it speaks to his thought process about the region he 
was trying to open up to trade. 
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the levee in a place where he had a few connections from home.  Should this job not pan out, he 
could take the overlDQGURXWHWRWKH3DFLILFDQGWKH2ULHQW)LQDOO\LIKRPHVLFNQHVVGLGQ¶WDEDWH
his journey home would be much shorter from Minnesota than it would from the East Coast 
(Martin, 1991, 28-29). 
After living in Minnesota for about four years, Hill met Mary Mehegan and started to court 
her.  However, even though he was now considering marriage, his passion for Asia had not left 
him during this time; the pull towards the Orient was constantly with him.  Hill would often talk 
with Mary about the possibility of going to India to run steamboats up the Ganges River (Martin, 
1991, 62; Malone, 1996, 18). 
Hill was motivated by the potential he saw in Asian markets.  Hill saw the large population 
in China and wanted to take advantage of it by creating more demand for agricultural goods 
produced in the Midwest.  Hill wanted to convert the Chinese from rice to wheat to channel 
American agricultural surpluses abroad and keeping the prices high for domestic farmers.  In a 
speech at a reception for Senator Davis in September 1898, Hill said:  
Lying to the west of us is one-third of the population of the globe.  That one-third 
LVQRWDQLJQRUDQWEDUEDURXVSHRSOHEXWDOHDUQHGSHRSOH«*REDFNDQGUHDGWKH
history of the world.  The nation that has controlled the trade of the Orient has held 
WKHSXUVHVWULQJVRIWKHZRUOG«2XUFRXQWU\FDQQRWVWDQGVWLOO6KHPXVWJRDKHDG
RUEDFNZDUGV«6KDOOZHtake part in [the development of the Orient trade] or shall 
ZH«EXLOGD&KLQHVHZDOODQG go behind it? (Quoted in Martin, 1991, 471). 
 
In a letter written from Hill to his shipbuilding associate and longtime friend, Senator Mark Hanna, 
during this same year, Hill expressed a similar sentiment, stating that all that was required to make 
the Chinese suitable consumers was proper government and education.  He attested:  
I believe there will be a commercial development on the Pacific Ocean in the next 
twenty years which will surpass any commercial growth the world has seen in the 
last thousand years.  China and Japan alone contain nearly one-third of the 
population of the globe; and the Chinaman, while his education and civilization is 
[sic] different from ours, is commercially speaking capable of the greatest 
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development.  When they have a good government, which will not systematically 
rob them, WKH\ZLOOGHYHORSYHU\UDSLGO\«2XUFRPPHUFLDO UHODWLRQVZLWK&KLQD
can be easily developed to an extent that would take one-third of our agricultural 
product, including cotton, and a very large amount of iron and steel (Quoted in 
Malone, 1996, 164-165). 
 
This quote again reveals that Hill was a visionary.  He foresaw that Asia was a rising market, and 
he predicted that China and Japan would grow to be major players in international trade, the Pacific 
Century as he called it, by 1920.  He miscalculated his time period a bit²KH³VDZD µ3DFLILF
&HQWXU\¶IRUWKHth Century, which actually has come in the 21st Century,´6²but this prediction 
reveals that he was forward-WKLQNLQJDQGDQWLFLSDWHG$VLD¶VSDWKWRWKHIXWXUH 
In addition to the potential consumers in Asian markets, Hill also thought that American 
exports could help bring civilization to the Asian continent.  This civilization, which Westerners 
believed began in the Middle East and Europe, could be brought full circle around the globe.  This 
civilization sent across the Pacific Ocean would be an amalgam of Christianity, individualism, and 
FRPPHUFLDOLVPEDVHGRQ³WKHFRUQXFRSLDRI$PHULFDQDJULFXOWXUDOPXQLILFHQFH´0DORQH 1996, 
164).  Hill dreamed big, and usually his plans were well-thought-out; howevHU³WKHVKDUS-eyed 
UHDOLVWLQWKLVFDVHLJQRUHGVRPHYHU\KDUGIDFWV´0DORQH 1996, 165).  The Chinese and Japanese 
PRVWOLNHO\GLGQ¶WZDQW$PHULFDQKHOSWRPDNHWKHPPRUHµFLYLOL]HG¶DQG+LOO¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDW
WKH\ ZHUHQ¶W FLYLOL]HG VLPSO\ EHFDXVH WKeir culture was different was a very conceited and 
jingoistic perspective.  The economic development that would have to take place to turn the 
impoverished Chinese into Western-style consumers of surplus crops and manufactures would 
take decades rather than a few years, as Hill hoped.   In addition, his plan to convert Asians from 
rice to wheat was also a bit far-fetched and idealistic (Malone, 1996, 165).  It would be interesting 
                                                   
6 This is a quote from Professor Richard Bohr, an Asian Studies scholar and professor at College of Saint Benedict 
DQG6DLQW-RKQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\LQLee EgerVWURP¶VDUWLFOH 
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to see how long it would have taken for the cultural changes that this plan required to have caught 
RQLQ$VLDLI+LOO¶VDWWHPSWVDWWUDGHZLWK$VLDKDGQRWEHHQIUXVWUDWHGE\JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQ 
7KHLGHDRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHZLWK$VLDZDVVWLOOLQWKHEDFNRI+LOO¶VPLQGDV+LOOZRUNHG
on the Great Northern line from St. Paul, MN to Seattle, WA.  In 1892, Hill sent Herman Rosenthal 
WRVXUYH\SURVSHFWVLQ(DVW$VLD8SRQKLVUHWXUQ5RVHQWKDOUHSRUWHGWKDW&KLQD³GLGQRWDIIRUG
PXFKWUDGHRSSRUWXQLW\EXWUDSLGO\PRGHUQL]LQJDQGLQGXVWULDOL]LQJ-DSDQGLG´0DORQH 1996, 
166).  Hill sent another man, Captain James Griffiths, to Asia in 1896 when east-bound shipments 
of Northwest lumber caused surplus capacity on west-ERXQG WUDLQV +H FKDUJHGKLP³WR ORRN
closer, this time at the actual manifests of ships unloading their cargoes at East Asian ports²no 
HDV\WDVNVLQFHVKLSSHUVJXDUGHGVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQMHDORXVO\´0DORQH 1996, 166-167).  Since 
Hill could not build his own fleet at this time, he contracted with the largest Japanese steamship 
line, forging the first formal maritime link between Japan and the U.S. 
In the summer of 1899 Hill started designing the ships and in fall of 1900, he borrowed $5 
million and commissioned his two ships in anticipation of increased trade with Asia (Martin, 1991, 
473-474).  He tried to apply what had been successful in railroads²high tonnages and low rates²
to the shipping industry. The Minnesota and the Dakota were built to carry over twenty thousand 
tons of freight (in five acres of tonnage space) and two hundred first class passengers.  These ships 
were the largest of their day.  The Minnesota was launched in 1902,7 but did not go into service 
until 1905.  On its maiden voyage, it carried twenty-six thousand tons of lumber, copper, and 
cotton; the return trip brought back silk.  Unfortunately for Hill, the ships traveled very slowly and 
                                                   
7 There is a discrepancy in the research here.  Martin (1991) states that the Minnesota was launched on April 16, 
DQG³VRPHLQYLWHGJXHVWV«FKHHUHGDV&ODUD>RQHRI+LOO¶VGDXJKWHUV@VZXQJWKHERWWOHRIFKDPSDJQH
DJDLQVWWKHERZ´ZKLOH0DORQHZULWHVWKDW&ODUD³FKULVWHQHG>WKHMinnesota] with the customary champagne 
ERWWOHZKLOHIRUW\WKRXVDQGSHRSOHORRNHGRQLQ$SULO´(LWKHUZD\DIHZ\HDUVSDVVHGEHWZHHQWKH
initial launching of the ships and the Minnesota¶VPDLGHQYR\DJH 
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could only make four round-trips per year.  The slow speed of the ships made finding passengers 
difficult, and the ships were soon obsolete as technological advances came swiftly (Malone, 1996, 
247-248, 276-277; Martin, 1991, 544-+LOO¶VGDEEOLQJZLWKVKLSSLQJFDXVHGDOPRVWFRQVWDQW
IUXVWUDWLRQ7KHJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGQ¶WSURYLGHDQ\VXEVLGLHVDQGWKH\UHJXODWHGWKDWUDLOURDGVPXVW
publish both domestic and export rates, which would inform international competitors and allow 
them to underbid Hill (Malone, 1996, 247-248).  Martin and Malone claim that Hill failed in his 
shipping attempts to Asia because he was inexperienced in the field, government regulation made 
trade economically and politically unfeasible, and the Asian markets were not developed enough 
to be receptive.  However, his idea of using massive tonnages to reduce rates and the belief that 
Asian markets would oQHGD\GHPDQG$PHULFD¶VFURSVPHWDOV, and other products were admirable 
and forward-thinking (Malone, 1996, 276-277). 
According to the traditional story, the JRYHUQPHQW SRVHG WKHPRVW SUREOHPV IRU+LOO¶V
ambitions in Asia.  In order to successfully compete in Asian trade, Hill needed a government-
supported merchant fleet and market subsidies, similar to those provided by European 
governments (Malone, 1996, 165).  However, the government was not so obliging.  The ICC 
refused to allow lower through-rates on cargo bound for the Orient, which would make it difficult 
for the U.S. H[SRUWVWREHFRPSHWLWLYHZLWK(XURSHDQH[SRUWV+LOOGHVSDLUHGVD\LQJ³$PHULFDLV
not a commercial nation, and until she has to make greater efforts to support her population than 
has been necessary in the past, I do not see how she will become important among the leading 
H[SRUWLQJQDWLRQVRIWKHZRUOG´0DORQH 1996, 202).  Hill was emotionally drawn to Asia and 
always regretted unrealized ambitions involving the Far East, both for himself and his country. 
+LOO¶VREVHVVLRQLQWKe Orient is worth pondering because some scholars today think that 
+LOO¶VFRQWHPSRUDULHVZHUHQRWYHU\LQWHUHVWHd in expanding their businesses abroad.  Instead, they 
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were more concerned with developing their businesses domestically.  H.W. Brands argues that this 
was common for the majority of capitalists in the mid- to late 19th century.  While the capitalists 
of mDQ\(XURSHDQQDWLRQV VRXJKWQHZYHQWXUHV DEURDG ³$PHULFDQFDSLWDOLVWVFRQFHQWUDWHGRQ
WKHLUKRPHPDUNHW´%UDQGV 2010, 20).  This argument is not supported by the example of Hill.  
+LOO¶V FRQVWDQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI $VLDQ PDUNHWV DV GLVSOD\HG LQ KLV VSHHches, writings, and 
biographies, reveals that foreign trade was definitely seen by some as the way of the future.  
Though +LOO¶V SODQV to never came to fruition, the mere fact that he thought about Asia and 
attempted to make his dreams a reality runs counter to what modern scholars attest. 
 
L iterature Review 
There is very little literature currently on this subject aside from general statements on the 
fact that there was foreign trade between the United States and East Asia going on between 1865 
and 1914.  Some of these general statements can be found in Martin (1991) and Brands (2010).8 
These pages talk about the small amount of trade that was already taking place as well as people 
who called for more trade with the Orient in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Howard 
6FKRQEHUJHUZURWHDQDUWLFOHWKDWFDSWXUHVPRVWRIWKHGHWDLOVRI+LOO¶VOLIHJRDORIUHDFKLQJ
the Orient and how this dream was shattered due to government regulation.  This paper is a 
ZRQGHUIXO WHVWDPHQW WR+LOO¶VGHVLUH WR WUade with Asia, but again, it only provided qualitative 
evidence.  $UWLFOHVWKDWGRRIIHUTXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVVXFKDV&KDR¶VDQG5H\QROGV¶
studies on the Chinese cotton trade with the United States, Britain, and Japan, are limited to a 
single industry and cannot offer an overarching picture of U.S.-Chinese trade patterns. 
                                                   
8 The page numbers within these references are on pages 21-22, 28-29, and 471-474 in Martin (1991) and on pages 
499, 522, 525, and 527 in Brands (2010). 
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After reading the WZRELRJUDSKLHVRI+LOO¶VOLIH written by Martin and Malone and the article 
by Schonberger, I noticed that references to Asia were few and far between, even though this idea 
was a lifelong passion for him.  Hill even dedicates two full chapters to his dreams of foreign trade 
in his autobiography, Highways of Progress (1910).  The overall silence on this topic, as well as 
the lack of quantitative analysis of foreign trade between the United States and China during this 
time period inspired this research. 
Lipsey (2000) is another valuable background source.  His article covers the general topic 
of U.S. foreign trade.  He addresses the time period from 1800 to 1914, which is a wider range of 
time than I am analyzing.  His results are mostly aggregate totals of trade, and they focus mainly 
on Europe because that is where the United States traded heavily during this period, but his work 
will still be helpful in understanding the big picture of American trade during the 19th and early 
20th centuries.  )LVKORZDOVRSURYLGHGPHZLWKDFRQWH[WXDOEDFNJURXQGRQUDLOURDGV+LOO¶V
life work, during the 19th and early 20th centuries.  While this essay will not directly contribute to 
my SDSHULWGLGKHOSPHWRIUDPH+LOO¶VOLIH. 
Brands (2010) makes an important point on foreign trade because he makes an interesting 
proposition early in his book.  He attests that while the capitalists of many European nations sought 
QHZYHQWXUHVDEURDG³$PHULFDQFDSLWDOLVWVFRQFHQWUDWHGRQWKHLUKRPHPDUNHW´%UDQGV
20).  Many modern scholars support this view; hRZHYHU+LOO¶VVWRU\UHYHDOVWKDW$PHULFDQVGLGQ¶W
concentrate on the home market simply because they were uninWHUHVWHGLQPDUNHWVDEURDG+LOO¶V
interest in and passion to trade with Asia bordered on obsessive, and scholars attribute his failure 
to external sources rather than a lack of interest in foreign trade. 
 
Theoretical Model 
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In order to understand why countries ever choose to  trade with each other, it is necessary 
to look at economic theory.  The motivation behind international trade is the comparative 
advantage theory.9  In 1800, David Ricardo derived the principle of comparative advantage from 
Adam SmitK¶s principle of absolute advantage.  Before explaining the differences between these 
two theories, it is important to understand the foundational labor theory of value.  This theory 
assumes that there is only one factor of production, labor, and it is of the same quality across the 
nation.  The price of a good singularly reflects the amount of labor that went into its production.  
For example, if China can produce a yard of silk with less labor than the United States, the 
production cost and, in turn, the price of silk in China will be lower than in the United States. 
Smith built off the labor theory of value and proposed that the United States and China 
should each produce the goods in which they have an absolute cost advantage²meaning a lower 
production cost²for export and then import those goods in which it does not have an absolute 
advantage.  The problem with this theory is that each country must be able to produce at least one 
good in which it has an absolute advantage; otherwise, Smith contends, trade will not benefit the 
country which is able to produce all goods less expensively than the other country. 
Ricardo modified this theory and presented his modifications as the principle of 
comparative advantage.  This theory determines trading patterns EDVHGRQDFRXQWU\¶V relative, 
rather than absolute, advantage.  According to the theory of comparative advantage, the United 
States and China should specialize in and export the goods in which each has the lowest 
opportunity cost of production.  Opportunity cost is a measure of what a producer must give up in 
order to get something.  For example, the fertile tracts of land in the southern United States can 
                                                   
9 I found the specific information for comparative advantage and the terms of trade in Carbaugh, 2013, Chapter 2.  
However, background information on comparative advantage could be found in any introductory economics 
textbook, and information on the terms of trade is included in many international economics textbooks. 
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grow many crops.  The opportunity cost of growing cotton on that land is the amount of money a 
farmer would make if he chose to grow an agricultural product other than cotton, such as tobacco 
or indigo.  If both China and the United States produce and export those goods in which their labor 
productivity is high²meaning it is relatively less inefficient to produce²both nations will receive 
output gains from this specialization because they do not need to dedicate resources to industries 
where labor productivity is low and goods are relatively more expensive to produce.  They can 
simply trade for those goods which would take a relatively large amount of labor to produce 
domestically. 
It would be insightful to examine the sources of comparative advantage based on the factors 
of production in both the United States and China during this time period to see how each country 
benefitted from trade.  The Heckscher-Ohlin model focuses on capital intensity and labor intensity 
as the sources of comparative advantage.  The Specific Factors model divides the factors of 
production into capital, labor, and land; capital and land are assumed to be fixed while labor 
mobility is possible.10  Both of these models offer deeper insights into U.S.-China trade, but the 
sources of comparative advantage go beyond the scope of this project and therefore will not be 
addressed in this paper.  This thesis will only examine revealed comparative advantage, which will 
be determined by looking at the data in order to see which goods were most commonly traded 
between 1865 and 1914.   
Through revealed comparative advantage, it appears that the United States had a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods, with capital in the form of factories, refineries, 
and other industrial processes.  China had a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods.  Since 
                                                   
10  I  found  the  specific  information  on  the  Heckscher-­‐Ohlin  and  Specific  Factors  models  in  Krugman,  Obstfeld,  and  
Melitz,  2012,  Chapters  4  and  5.    However,  background  information  on  these  models  could  be  found  in  any  
intermediate  economics  textbook.  
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both countries specialized in a different factor of production, they could each produce goods that 
were inexpensive for them to produce and trade for those goods that would be relatively more 
expensive to produce themselves.  It was advantageous for the United States to produce goods that 
required intensive capital inputs²such as cotton manufactures and refined mineral oil²because 
they had an established foundation in industry.  Conversely, it was advantageous for China to 
produce goods that were labor intensive²such as silk and tea²because they had a large labor 
force and lacked factories to speed up manufacturing goods.  Each country specialized by 
producing the goods that it could efficiently produce, and then the two countries traded with one 
another.  This theory is foundational for all trading relationships.   
However, sometimes trade is limited by external factors.  One possible limitation to the 
China-United States trade relationship was that both countries were well-endowed with natural 
resources.  Keller et al. PDNHDQLQWHUHVWLQJFRQWHQWLRQWKDW³ODUJHFRXQWULHVWHQGWREHOHVV
open to trade than smaller countULHVQRW OHDVWEHFDXVHPDQ\JRRGVDUHDYDLODEOHGRPHVWLFDOO\´
(888).  It is possible that the United States did not see much profit in focusing on international 
markets when it could develop internal markets instead.  Indeed, this is one of the arguments for 
+LOO¶V ODFN RI VXFFHVV LQ WKH $VLDQ PDUNHW WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV IRFXVHG VR PXFK RQ LQWHUQDO
development that it did not notice the profits that could be made in the Asian market. 
Another potential limitation of trade in the United States is the involvement of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).  Interference by the commission is another oft-cited reason for 
+LOO¶VIDLOXUHLQWKH$VLDQPDUNHW  This commission, which was established in 1887 through the 
Interstate Commerce Act, passed regulations which limited the ability of transportation companies 
in the United States that were interested in developing international trade to compete with foreign 
companies in Europe and Canada that received subsidies from their respective governments.  The 
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commission targeted railroads by regulating shipping rates, which would ensure fair rates and 
eliminate rate discrimination. 
 
Descriptive Model 
In order to make the theory operational, I developed data on bilateral trade between the 
United States and China.  Once I collected my data, I chose to analyze it by looking at the terms 
of trade for the United States. 
 
Terms of Trade Equation 
ܶ݁ݎ݉ݏ  ݋݂  ܶݎܽ݀݁ ൌ ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ  ܲݎ݅ܿ݁  ܫ݊݀݁ݔ
ܫ݉݌݋ݎݐ  ܲݎ݅ܿ݁  ܫ݊݀݁ݔ   ݔ  ͳͲͲ 
 
The terms of trade measure the relationship between the prices a nation receives for its 
exports and the prices it pays for its imports over a specific time period (Carbaugh, 2013, 43).  
This equation only measures the terms of trade for one country, and it is made into an index 
because the change over time, rather than the absolute value of each number, is the component 
that is analyzed.  For example, in a given year, the United States sends a certain dollar value of 
goods to China as exports and receives a certain dollar value of goods in imports.  Over time, the 
terms of trade can become more favorable or less favorable for the United States.  Assuming that 
the prices of goods remain constant throughout the years, if terms of trade improve for the United 
States, they receive more imports for the same level of exports sent to China.  Since their goods 
are becoming more valuable, they receive a greater value of goods in return.  The reverse is also 
true: if the terms of trade become less favorable over time, the United States would receive fewer 
imports for that same level of exports sent to China. 
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Data Sources 
I compiled my data from two sources.  The primary data source comes from the Department 
of the Treasury.  The Treasury keeps records called the Annual Report and Statements of the Chief 
of the Bureau of Statistics on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States.  These reports 
contain detailed records of imports and exports in order to collect duties on the proper goods.  
Since this report is published annually, I am using several different reports, one report for each 
year I am observing.  I have access to forty-four years of these reports, which gives me a fairly 
accurate picture of trade over this fifty-year period. 
The second source that offers a quantitative analysis on the topic of aggregate foreign trade 
between China and the United States during the time period between the Civil War and World 
War I is a book titled The Trade of the United States with China.  It is a dissertation written in 
1924 by Shu-Lun Pan.  I used VRPHRI3DQ¶VWDEOHVDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUP\UHVHDUFK  His research 
gives me access to the breakdown of goods into a few broad categories and the aggregate totals of 
imports and exports for the years 1870, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1898, 1901, 1903, 1905, 
1907, 1909, 1911, 1912, and 1913.  The categories Pan chose to use were usually those which 
revealed the most trade between countries.  I chose a selection from his categories to analyze in 
my own charts.  Of the six years for which I could not get data from the Commerce and Navigation 
reportsRQO\RQHRIWKHPZDVLQFOXGHGLQ3DQ¶VGLVVHUWDWLRQVR,XVHGKLVGDWDIRUWKH\HDU11 
2QHEHQHILWWRXVLQJWKHDQQXDO&RPPHUFHDQG1DYLJDWLRQUHSRUWVRYHU3DQ¶Vdata is that 
the annual reports are broken down into the component parts of imports and exports.  One can see 
                                                   
11 2QHLPSRUWDQWQRWHDERXW3DQ¶VGDWDLVWKHIDFWWKDWKHWKDW3DQLQFOXGHV³2SLXPDQGH[WUDFWRI´LQKLV³&KHPLFDOV
GUXJV G\HV DQGPHGLFLQHV´ FDWHJRU\ VR WKH GDWD IRU ³&KHPLFDOV´ IRU  LV VOLJKWO\ LQIODWHG DQG WKH GDWD IRU
³2SLXP´LVRPLWWHGIRUWKLs year. 
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exactly how much of each good was being traded and the price at which it was traded in each year.  
3DQ¶VGDWD is broken down a little bit, but the Commerce and Navigation reports are much more 
detailed, while Pan focuses more on the aggregate amounts of goods imported and exported in 
each year he observed.  Though I did end up using many of the categories Pan did because those 
goods were the most heavily traded, it was insightful to see the quantity of goods traded, the values 
for each of those goods, and the consistency or the rarity with which they were traded year after 
year. 
 
Quantitative Results 
First, I will present my results for the trading patterns revealed in the data.  As illustrated 
in Figure 1, total trade between the United States and China increased between 1865 and 1914.  
Total imports increased by a factor of 7.7 while total exports increased by a factor of 3.8.  The 
other notable element in Figure 1 is the spike in exports in 1905.  Exports drastically start 
increasing in 1903 and drop off sharply in 1907.  I will discuss some potential causes of this spike 
later in my results. 
Figure 2 is the breakdown of total exports by commodities.  The main commodities driving 
the increase in exports were cotton²both manufactured and unmanufactured²and mineral oil.  
Cotton manufactures start increasing sharply around the turn of the 20th century, and mineral oil 
follows closely by starting to increase in 1903.  Raw cotton and cotton manufactures increase by 
a factor of 651 between 1865 and 1914; over a slightly abbreviated time period, 1873-1914, 
mineral oil increases by a factor of 22.8.  One commodity that you will notice did not contribute 
greatly to U.S. exports to China was wheat and wheat flour.  In only two years, 1907 and 1912, 
did wheat exports exceed $2 million.  +LOO¶VSODQVUHOLHGKHDYLO\RQWKH&KLQHVHSXUFKDVLQJDJUHDW
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deal of agricultural products from the United States; in reality, this was a small contribution to 
foreign trade.  Iron and steel, both unmanufactured and goods made of these metals, was another 
sector that Hill thought he could exploit.  The data reveals that during this time period, the Chinese 
were not interested in iron and steel goods, as the value of these exports never exceeded 3 million 
dollars. 
Another good that Hill strongly depended on was unmanufactured cotton.  He planned to 
export raw cotton to China, have the Chinese manufacture it, and then import the completed cotton 
manufactures to sell to Americans.  Figure 3 reveals that the reality of trade did not support this 
plan.  Throughout the majority of the time period, the United States exported no unmanufactured 
cotton to China.  Even in the peak year, 1912,12 the United States exported less than 2.6 million 
GROODUV¶ZRUWKRIUDZFRWWRQWR&KLQD13  As Figure 3 shows, exports of cotton manufactures were 
much more common than raw cotton, revealing Hill again misjudged the current trading trends 
when it came to the commodity of cotton. 
The most important commodity imported from China between 1865 and 1914 was silk.  
Looking at Figure 4, silk increased from a negligible amount of value in 1865 to nearly $17 million 
worth in 1914.14  This is an increase by a factor of 84.  The other notable U.S. import from China 
is tea.  Tea declines from its peak of more than $16.5 million in 1873 to less than $3 million in 
1914, a decline in over 80% of the value.  However, this does not mean that tea was not an 
important commodity.  In fact, until 1907, it was still the second costliest commodity imported 
from China, behind silk.  Figure 5 shows some other important imports, even though they were 
                                                   
12 This year, it is also important to note, is later than Hill anticipated.  His ship, the Minnesota, sailed in 1905, and he 
hoped to see immediate profits from these ships.  His plan did not include waiting seven years to see results in 
&KLQD¶VFRWton market. 
13  Table  1  in  the  Appendix  lists  the  values  of  raw  cotton  and  cotton  manufactures  that  were  exported  to  China  in  
selective  years.  
14  Table  2  in  the  Appendix  lists  the  values  of  silk  and  tea  imported  from  China  in  selective  years.  
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not as important as tea and silk.  Some of these imports are hides and skins, wool, and vegetable 
oil. 
When evaluating the terms of trade, I set the base year for the index in 1914, so both the 
indices²for total U.S. terms of trade and U.S.-China terms of trade²are aligned to the same point 
in 1914 so they can be compared.  Figure 6 reveals that the terms of trade became more favorable 
for the United States from 1865 to 1914, increasing from about 74 to 100 over these fifty years. 
The U.S. terms of trade with China, however, were not favorable over the course of the time period 
and were less favorable than the overall terms of trade during a majority of these fifty years; from 
1865 to 1914, the terms of trade decreased from 202 to 100.  The terms of trade with China 
generally declined until it reached a value of 11.6 in 1873, then remained low for more than twenty 
years, when it started increasing again in 1895.  Terms of trade with China surpassed general terms 
of trade in 1902 and then remained relatively close to the total terms of trade until 1914, excluding 
the anomalous spike in 1905.   
7KLVUHVXOWGLIIHUVIURPWKHUHVXOWVWKDWZRXOGEHREWDLQHGIURP3DQ¶VGDWD:KHQORRNLQJ
DW3DQ¶VWHUPVRIWUDGH, as shown in Figure 7, the terms of trade appear favorable for the United 
States both for the country as a whole and for the U.S.-China trade.  The total terms of trade for 
the United States as a whole increased from 72 to 100 over the forty-four year period.  The terms 
of trade did rise to over 100 between 1898 and 1905, then dipped before finally ending at 100 in 
1913.  The U.S. terms of trade with China was even more drastic.  Between 1870 and 1913, it 
increased from 38 to 100.  The terms of trade dropped off drastically, all the way down below 9 in 
1880 before it experienced the conspicuous spike that peaked at 350 in 1905, just like total exports.  
This anomalous spike also drops off in 1907 and tapers down until it reaches 100 in 1913.  Even 
if we ignore the spike between 1903 and 1907, terms of trade greatly increased over the period, 
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and were at a higher level than total U.S. terms of trade after 1901, revealing that it was very 
favorable for the United States to trade with China, even more so than the rest of the world.  Since 
data from 1865-1869 is not included, the steep decline of U.S.-Chinese terms of trade during those 
five years is not observed, completely changing the results and suggesting dramatically favorable 
U.S. terms of trade with China over the time period. 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the &KLQHVHVKDUHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶ foreign trade.  This graph 
illustrates the percentage of imports from China as a percentage of total U.S. imports and the 
percentage of exports to China as a percentage of total U.S. exports.  The Chinese share of U.S. 
exports decreased over the fifty-year time period from 2.78% of U.S. exports to 0.97% of U.S. 
exports.  This decline occurred early in the time period, dropping below 1% in 1871 and only 
rising above 1% in nine out of the next forty-three years.  Imports from China as a percentage of 
total U.S. imports also declines slightly from 1865 to 1914.  It starts at 2.06% and rises to a peak 
in of 4.18% in 1872, but then it generally declines to 1.98% in 1914.  These declines do not stem 
from a decline in total imports²as we saw earlier in Figure 1, both total imports and total exports 
are increasing over these forty-four years²but rather from the fact U.S. that trade with China is 
not growing as rapidly as U.S. trade with the rest of the world.  Therefore, relative to total U.S. 
trade rather than in absolute terms, imports to and exports from China are declining. 
$JDLQ3DQ¶VGDWDUHYHDOVGLIIHUHQWUHVXOWV:KHQORRNLQJDW&KLQD¶VVKDUHRI86IRUHLJQ
WUDGHGHULYHGIURP3DQ¶VGDWD in Figure 9, the Chinese share of U.S. exports increased over this 
time period.  Even though the increase was small in magnitude²only an increase from 0.68 
percent to 0.83 percent²it was a large increase proportionally, growing by over 20 percent.  The 
Chinese share of imports, on the other hand, decreased from 3.16 percent to 2.07 percent over this 
same time period. 
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:KHQFRPSDULQJWKHWZRGDWDVHWV¶UHVXOWVRIWKH&KLQHVHVKDUHRI86IRUHLJQWUDGH3DQ¶V
shortened time period is the cause of the discrepancies more so than his five-year intervals.  His 
smoothed data does not miss any vital trends, but, by starting in 1870 rather than 1865, his measure 
of the Chinese share of imports decreases significantly rather than barely decreasing and his 
measure of the Chinese share of exports increases slightly rather than decreasing substantially. 
To more carefully analyze the data in Figures 6 and 8 and to show the connection between 
the two, I will break down my fifty-year time period into three sub-periods.  The first sub-period 
is from 1865-1871.  This, as seen in Figures 6 and 8, was a period of decline in the U.S. terms of 
trade with China²even though U.S. total terms of trade were stable during this time period²and 
a decline in U.S. exports to China as a percentage of total U.S. exports.  Imports from China were 
increasing during this time, but the exports to China remained relatively constant and low, 
contributing to this decline in the terms of trade with China. 
One explanation for this is that both countries were recovering from their respective civil 
wars and were trying to determine what the other FRXQWU\ZRXOGOLNHWREX\&KLQD¶VH[SRUWVWR
the United States were almost solely driven by tea, which increased by nearly eight million dollars 
in the seven years after the end of the civil wars.  No other commodity from China exceeds $2.2 
million worth of trade during this time period.  This could be because the United States had a high 
tariff during this time in order to protect home industries, so it was expensive to import goods from 
China that could be produced in the United States. 
No single commodity exported from the United States in these seven years exceeded $2.5 
million worth of trade.  Agriculture and manufacturing industries suffered during the U.S. Civil 
War and could not produce as much capacity as they used to.  It is also possible that the United 
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States did not know what the Chinese wanted to buy and had to figure out what they could sell to 
China. 
The second sub-period covers the years 1872-1895.  This is a period of relative stability 
both LQWKHWHUPVRIWUDGHDQGLQ&KLQD¶VVKDUHRI86WUDGH7KHUHLVRQO\RQHVSLNHGXULQJWKLV
time period in 1878, preceded by falling imports from China four years before this spike.  This can 
be partially explained by a drought in China from 1876-1878, ZKLFKKDVEHHQ³LGHQWLILHGDVWKH
PRVWVHYHUHDQGH[WUHPHRQHLQ1RUWK&KLQDRYHUWKHSDVW\HDUV´ZhiXin et al., 2010, 3001).  
U.S. imports of both silk and tea show this same downward trend, revealing that these crops could 
have been affected by the GURXJKWZKLFKLQWXUQDIIHFWHG&KLQD¶VDELOLW\WRH[SRUW 
The years 1896 to1914 comprise the third sub-period.  This is a period of erratic 
movements in the U.S. terms of trade with China as well as U.S. exports to China as a share of 
total U.S. exports.  The changing political situation in China probably contributed greatly to the 
fitful trading patterns.  In 1865, the Chinese government quelled the Taiping Rebellion and 
GHFODUHGLWVLQWHQWLRQWRUHFRYHUIURPFLYLOZDUWKURXJK³6HOI-6WUHQJWKHQLQJ´UHIRUPs.  Through 
these reforms, China intended to modernize and become self-sufficient rather than reliant on 
foreign countries for trade.  This did not really come to pass, however, and the Self-Strengthening 
Movement was declared a failure by the government iQIROORZLQJ-DSDQ¶VGHIHDWRI&KLQD
in the Sino-Japanese War.  This defeat led to a loss of Chinese power and influence as well as a 
decline in internal stability.  Japan started to become a colonizer, annexing Korea and Taiwan after 
this victory.  Japan was prevented from inflicting harsher punishment on China through its 
acquisition of the Liaodong peninsula by European nations who felt their claims on China were 
being threatened (DuBois, 2013, 14).  Scholars have tried to discern why the Chinese Self-
Strengthening reforms were unsuccessful and why they were so easily defeated by the Japanese; 
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WKH\KDYHFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH4LQJDUP\ZDVGHIHDWHGEHFDXVHRI³SRRUDUPDPHQWVLQVXI¿FLHQW
training, lack of leadership, vested interests, lack of funding, and low moralH´(OPDQ
but the explanation as to why the Chinese were unable to modernize and attain these features 
during the Self-Strengthening Movement is still a topic of debate. 
$IWHU&KLQD¶VLQWHUQDOZHDNQHVVSHUVLVWHGDQGVWDELOLW\FRXOGQRWEHUHJDLQHG³,Q
rapid succession China suffered two more wars: the eight nation suppression of the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900 and a showdown between Russia and Japan in 1904-05, which was fought 
ODUJHO\RQ&KLQHVHVRLO´'X%RLV,QDGGLWLRQWR&KLQD¶VLQWHUQDOZHDNQHVV-DSDQ¶V
YLFWRU\RYHU5XVVLDVROLGLILHGLWDVWKHSUHHPLQHQWSRZHULQWKHUHJLRQ-DSDQ¶VQHZHVWLPSHULDO
acquisition, Manchuria, was accepted by the major Western powers.  In return for supporting 
Japan, Western governments²especially Britain, France, and the United States²requested that 
&KLQDHYHQLQLWVLQVWDELOLW\EHNHSWLQWDFWSROLWLFDOO\DQGWHUULWRULDOO\EHFDXVHWKH\GLGQ¶WZDQWWR
lose their trading opportunities with China (DuBois, 2013, 14-15).  China had little input, 
compared to the major Western powers and the regional power of Japan, into the politics of the 
region.  During the Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905, China watched Japan win victories over 
Russia.  The Chinese might have been frightened that Japan would attack them again.  They could 
have responded to this threat by starting to import more goods to build up their reserves.  Imports 
of cotton cloth could have been intended to make uniforms and mineral oil could have been 
imported to be a fuel source for the Chinese army if it should be called to fight. 
 
The 1905 Spike 
The most notable element in several of the graphs is the spike in exports to China, which, 
as Figures 2 and 3 revealed, was driven largely by cotton manufactures.  Chao (1986) describes 
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the type of cotton goods Americans would have exported and the Chinese market for those goods.  
American cloth was the prominent form of a manufactured cotton export.  This cloth was rough, 
heavy, and coarse, and this type of cloth was preferred by the peasant classes; Britain was well-
known for producing the lighter, finer cotton cloths, which catered to the wealthier urban residents 
(109-110).  American cloth, since it was widely demanded, was a prominent export between 1890 
and 1905 ³DOPRVW GRXEOLQJHYHU\ ILYH \HDUV´ &KDR  After 1905 though, exports 
dropped off dramatically.  This analysis corresponds with the results revealed in Figure 3. 
Chao (1986) proposes two reasons why exports of cotton manufactures dropped off so 
dramatically after 1905.  7KHILUVWLVWKDW&KLQD¶VKDQGZHDYLQJLQGXVWU\started to take off, and the 
cloth they could now make on their handlooms competed with the coarse cloth the United States 
produced.  The second competing force was the large textile mills that were being built in East 
Asia.  The first modern mill was EXLOWLQ6KDQJKDLLQDQGLWGLGQ¶WWDNHORQJIRUWKHLQGXVWU\
to develop and force out the United States (119-120). 
These reasons explain why, after ten strong years of increasing exports of cotton 
manufactures to China, U.S. exports drop off so dramatically.  They do not explain, however, what 
lead to the anomalous spike from 1904-1905 in the first place.  Chao (1986) does not provide a 
reason for the increase in exports of cotton manufactures from $4.1 million to $27.8 million in this 
one year, but he does leave a clue in one of his tables.15  This table reveals that Chinese imports of 
cotton cloth from the United States increased by nearly 9% between 1902 and 1905.  The majority 
of this increase was taken from the British, whose exports dropped by 6% during this time period.  
It is strange that the United States, which produced heavy, coarse cloth would take such a large 
percentage away from Britain, a country known for its light, fine cloth. 
                                                   
15 Table 21: Shares of Imported Cotton Cloths, by Origin, 1902-1930, on page 121. 
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One potential explanation for this sudden jump is that the peasant classes demanded more 
coarse cotton cloth in 1905; however, it is unlikely that such a large gap would be driven solely 
by peasant GHPDQG$QDOWHUQDWLYHLVWRORRNDWZK\%ULWDLQ¶VVXSSO\RIFRWWRQFORWKGHFUHDVHGE\
6% between 1902 and 1905.  The majority of British cotton came from its Indian colony, and this 
cotton was grown in states such as Punjab, Rajasthan, and Haryana in Northern India 
(Chandrasekaran, Annadurai, & Somasundaram, 2010, 177).  In April 1905, an earthquake erupted 
in Kangra Valley, right in the midst of these northern states.  More than 20,000 people were killed, 
tens of thousands of homes and EXLOGLQJVZHUHGHVWUR\HGDQG³IDUPLQJZDVGLVUXSWHGE\WKHORVV
of 53,000 domestic animals and extensive damage to a network of hillside aqueducts that had been 
FRQVWUXFWHGRYHUPDQ\JHQHUDWLRQV´$PEUDVH\VDQG%LOKDP  It seems likely that this 
natural disaster disrupted the supply of raw cotton that would have been shipped to Britain, formed 
into cotton cloth, and then exported to China.  In order to meet demand in 1905, the Chinese had 
to adapt and accept more cotton cloth from America. 
The rise in raw cotton exports to China that begins just a few years before the outbreak of 
World War I signifies a trend that is just beginning.  The decreasing demand of U.S. cotton 
manufactures in China after 1905 was eventually set off by increasing demand of U.S. raw cotton, 
especially after World War I (Reynolds, 1986, 130).  As East Asian countries built their own textile 
mills and imported textile machinery of their own, their demand for raw cotton increased 
accordingly.  This is what the visionary Hill had originally expected.  His plans were finally being 
realized; unfortunately for him, this trend came too late. 
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 /HW¶V UHWXUQ WR WKHXQGHUO\LQJTXHVWLRQFRQQHFWLQJ+LOO¶V OLIH WR WKH WUDGHGDWDDQDO\]HG
above: why did Hill fail to establish large flows of trade into the relatively untapped market of 
China?  The traditional stories claim that the United States was too busy developing internal 
markets to focus on foreign trade, the Asian markets were not developed enough to welcome 
American goods, governmental interference by the ICC and a lack of government subsidies made 
foreign trade uneconomical and the ships Hill built were outdated before they ever set sail, sinking 
his Great Northern Steamship Co. before it ever got off the ground. 
I argue that the traditional story is incorrect.  While some of these stories mentioned above 
have elements of merit, the trade data reveals some other conclusions that should be incorporated 
LQWRDQ\QHZH[SODQDWLRQRI+LOO¶VDSSDUHQW IDLOXUH  The idea that America was an internally-
focused country without any foreign trade interests has been disproved.  Trade with Asia flourished 
between 1865 and 1914, as evidenced through this Chinese example, and this was only a small 
IUDFWLRQRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶IRUHLJQWUDGH   
The belief that Asian markets were not developed is a Western imposition on the East.  It 
harkens to the supposed superiority of Americans over the Chinese and the arrogant notion that 
the Chinese would be foolish to refuse any goods that Americans desired to thrust upon them.  The 
idea that the Chinese might not be interested in certain goods that Hill wanted to sell them, such 
as wheat as a replacement for rice, never occurred to him.   
Governmental interference through the ICC did contribute to increased shipping costs, and 
WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHIXVDO WR VXEVLGL]H+LOO¶V VKLSV GLG SXW KLP DW D GLVDGYDQWDJH DJDLQVW RWKHU
:HVWHUQSRZHUVKRZHYHUWKHUHLVQRJXDUDQWHHWKDWLIWKH86JRYHUQPHQWKDGVXEVLGL]HG+LOO¶V
venture²RUDWWKHYHU\OHDVWKDGQ¶WLQWHUIHUHGZLWKKLVWUDGH²that he would have been successful.  
His own failure in the midst of successful American trade, as revealed through increased U.S. 
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imports from and exports to China during this time, shows that his situation was not representative 
of the nation, for some American businessmen were able to profit in spite of government 
regulation.  As discussed above, +LOO¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVYDULHGGUDVWLFDOO\IURP&KLQD¶VGHVLUHV  This 
discrepancy between what Hill thought the Chinese wanted to buy and what the Chinese actually 
wanted to buy would have had to be remedied before any successful trading relationship would 
have been possible. 
Hill was not a naval man, and his ships may indeed have been outdated by the time the 
Minnesota finally made her maiden voyage; this technological disadvantage very likely 
FRQWULEXWHGWR+LOO¶VODFNRIVXFFHVV, directly impacting the flow of goods and distinguishing him 
from his American competitors.  +LOO¶VVKLSVKRZHYHUFDQQRWEHEODPHGHQWLUHO\IRUKLVIDLOXUH
for it must not be forgotten KRZEDGO\+LOOUHDGWKHPDUNHW+LOO¶VVKLSVZHUHEXLOWWRFDUU\VSHFLILF
goods that he supposeGWKH&KLQHVHZRXOGZDQWWRLPSRUW5HFDOOWKDW+LOO¶VILUVWYR\DJHVKLSSHG
lumber, copper, and cotton.  He also dreamed of sending wheat and manufactures of iron and steel 
in the near future in exchange for silk and cotton manufactures.  The Chinese, according to the 
data, were more interested in purchasing cotton manufactures from the United States.  Demand for 
cotton manufactures would require more careful packing and storing than raw materials,16 
VRPHWKLQJIRUZKLFK+LOO¶VVKLSVZHUHQRWGHVLJQHG 
7KHUHIRUH,SURSRVHDQHZSHUVSHFWLYH,DUJXHWKDW+LOO¶VIDLOXUHLQ$VLDVWHPPHGPRUH
from his misreading the market than from any external excuse.  Due to the fact that trade increased 
during the fifty years covered in this paper, it is evident that some Americans overcame the 
limitations created by the ICC and profited in Asian markets.  Hill was not so fortunate.  His vision 
                                                   
16 Chao (1986) comment on the process of shipping American cotton manufactures to China.  Often, these 
PDQXIDFWXUHVZHUHSDFNDJHGSRRUO\+HZULWHV³%DOHVRI$PHULFDQFORWKZHUHIDVWHQHGZLWh narrow metal strips 
ZKLFKFXWLQWRWKHEDOHVDQGGDPDJHGWKHPHUFKDQGLVHDQGWKHUHZDVQRZDWHUSURRILQJ´,WLVHDV\WRLPDJLQH
the frustrated Chinese suppliers who received such poorly-shipped merchandise to sell. 
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of China as a major trading partner was sound, but because he misread Chinese demand, Hill was 
unable to profit from trading ties with Asia. 
 
Conclusions and Continuing Research 
From these results explained in the previous two sections, I conclude that the patterns of 
trade reveal an increasing trend.  Both total U.S. exports to China and total U.S. imports from 
China increased between 1865 and 1914.  The data reveals that the United States had a comparative 
advantage in cotton manufactures and mineral oil while China had a comparative advantage in silk 
and tea.  I also conclude that the total terms of trade became more favorable for the United States 
over this same time period even though the terms of trade with China did not.  The terms of trade 
with China were only occasionally more favorable than they were for trade with the rest of the 
world.  The net Chinese share of U.S. foreign trade was also negative since the Chinese share of 
exports declines by nearly two percent and the Chinese share of imports remains nearly constant.  
7KHVHUHVXOWVUHYHDOWKDW+LOO¶VIDLOXUHVWHPPHGPRUHIURPKLVPisjudgment of the market and his 
desire to impose certain goods on the Chinese that they did not demand than from government 
regulation or a lack of interest in foreign trade. 
+LOO¶VLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK&KLQDDUHLPSRUWDQWWRVWXG\EHFDXVHKHOLYHGGXULQJWKe First Era 
of Globalization, when China was first opened up to international trade.  Today, we are living 
WKURXJKWKH6HFRQG(UDRI*OREDOL]DWLRQ+LOO¶VH[SHULHQFHJLYHVXVDJOLPSVHLQWRWKHSDVW WR
better understand our present-day trading relationship with China during this new era and learn 
IURP+LOO¶VPLVWDNHV. 
7KHPDLQOHVVRQWREHOHDUQHGIURP+LOO¶VIDLOXUHLQ&KLQDLVto know the market.  Hill tried 
to force goods on the Chinese.  He wanted them to buy raw cotton and wheat, even though they 
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were not interested in these goods.  He did not take the time to ask the Chinese what they wanted 
to buy and then cater to their desires.  Hill tried to single-KDQGHGO\FKDQJHDFRXQWU\¶VSUHIHUHQFHV
for certain goods.  He could not, and therefore, he was not able to take advantage of the potential 
in the Chinese market.  American businessmen today would be well-advised to know the market.  
They should talk to consumers in Asia, discover what these consumers want to buy, and then 
produce goods which meet that demand.  This approach may result in more successful trading 
relationships between the United States and Asia. 
Even though this project spanned the course of ten months, there is still research to be done 
on this topic.  The main element that is missing from this paper is research and data analysis on 
Japan.  The inclusion of Japan would allow for a more complete Asian analysis and would allow 
East Asian trade to be compared more thoroughly with U.S.-European trade, which was a much 
more prominent and established trading network between 1865 and 1914.  Another element of 
analysis which should be further researched would be the inclusion of quantity data.  This would 
eliminate fluctuations in the exchange rate and allow price levels to be adjusted for currency 
appreciation or depreciation over this time period.  Finally, including a study on the sources of 
comparative advantage with either the Heckscher-Ohlin model or the Specific Factors model 
would provide more insight into how the United States and China successfully interacted in trade 
with one another by understanding the advantage of choosing to produce the goods they did. 
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Figure  1:  Total  U.S.  Trade  with  China,  1865-­‐1914
Total  U.S.  Imports  from  China Total  U.S.  Exports  to  China
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years)  and  Pan  (1924).
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Figure  2:  U.S.  Exports  to  China  by  Commodity,  1865-­‐
1914
Coal Cotton,  and  mfrs  of Iron  and  steel,  and  mfrs  of
Mineral  Oil All  tobacco  and  mfrs  of Wheat  and  wheat  flour
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years)  and  Pan  (1924).
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Figure  3:  Exports  to  China  of  Unmanufactured  
Cotton  and  Cotton  Manufactures,  1865-­‐1914
Cotton,  unmanufactured Cotton,  manufactures  of
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years)  and  Pan  (1924).
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Figure  4:  U.S.  Imports  of  Silk  and  Tea  from  China,  
1865-­‐1914
Silk,  raw,  waste,  and  mfrs  of Tea
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years)  and  Pan  (1924).
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Figure  5:  Other  U.S.  Imports  from  China  by  
Commodity,  1865-­‐1914
Chemicals,  drugs,  dyes,  and  medicines Hides  and  skins,  other  than  fur
Oil,  vegetable Opium,  and  extract  of
Rice  and  rice  meal Wool,  unmanufactured  and  manufactures  of
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years)  and  Pan  (1924).
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Figure  6:  U.S.  Terms  of  Trade
Index  of  Total  Terms  of  Trade  in  the  U.S.  (1914=100) Index  of  U.S.  Terms  of  Trade  with  China  (1914=100)
Source: Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years),    Pan  (1924),  and  
Bureau  of  the  Census:  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  p.  244.
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Figure  7:  U.S.  Terms  of  Trade  with  Pan's  Data
Index  of  Total  Terms  of  Trade  in  the  U.S.  (1913=100) Index  of  US  Terms  of  Trade  with  China  (1913=100)
Source:  Pan,  pp.  42,  59-­‐60, 55-­‐56;  Bureau  of  the  Census:  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  p.  244.
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Figure  8:  Chinese  Share  of  U.S.  Foreign  Trade
Exports  to  China  as  a  %  of  total  U.S.  exports Imports  from  China  as  a  %  of  total  U.S.  imports
Source:  Annual  Reports  on  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the  United  States (various  years),  Pan  (1924),  and  
Bureau  of  the  Census:  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  p.  244.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1898 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1912 1913
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Years
Figure  9:  Chinese  Share  of  U.S.  Foreign  Trade  from  
Pan  Data
Exports  to  China  as  a  %  of  total  US  exports Imports  from  China  as  a  %  of  total  US  imports
Source:  Pan,  pp.  42,  59-­‐60, 55-­‐56;  Bureau  of  the  Census:  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  p.  244.
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Appendix 
Table 1: Unmanufactured Cotton and 
Cotton Manufactures, 1865-1914               
(in dollars) 
Years 
Cotton, 
unmanufactured 
Cotton, 
manufactures of 
1865 0 10402 
1870 0 526172 
1875 0 552444 
1880 0 339134 
1885 67 3414514 
1890 0 1231033 
1895 0 1723394 
1901 0 4620998 
1905 0 27761000 
1910 0 5831653 
1914 588240 6187639 
 
Table 2: U .S. Imports of Silk and Tea 
from China, 1865-1914 (in dollars) 
Years 
Silk, raw, waste, 
and mfrs. of Tea 
1865 201365 3732811 
1870 476905 9795933 
1875 682805 8745602 
1880 6936610 9995499 
1885 3830514 8038896 
1890 4465527 6858195 
1895 5902362 7534354 
1901 6516314 4863844 
1905 9191000 5903000 
1910 10268525 3275343 
1914 16984697 2757695 
 
